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\A unicameral legislature will cut government expense, increase the legislators accountability to
their constituents and improve eciency." Ventura (1998)
1 Introduction
During the last two decades, rampant corruption scandals and a generalized increase in the State
debt have cast dark shadows on the accountability of state legislators across the United States.1 This
has fostered a widespread debate on the eectiveness of current bicameral arrangements, leading to
the formulation of unicameral proposals in fourteen US states (Rogers 1999), the two most recent
ones having been put forward in California and New York in 2006 and 2010 respectively.2 Only
the years of the great depression have witnessed a similar level of unicameral initiatives, which
culminated in the decision of Nebraska, alone among all US states, to go unicameral in 1934. At
that time, this decision was viewed with suspicion and the fear was that Nebraska would become a
`lobbyist's paradise'.3 The historical evidence, however, shows that this fear was unfounded (Ewing
1937; Kolasa 1971; Shumate 1952), and in fact more recent data suggest that Nebraska ranks
amongst the least corrupt US states (Glaeser and Saks 2006, Corporate Crime Reporter 2004).
The lack of conclusive evidence on the advantages of bicameralism raises the fundamental ques-
tion of whether the second chamber is a useless duplication of the rst, as most unicameral proposals
suggest,4 or whether it serves the important purpose of increasing the accountability of elected rep-
resentatives.5 This controversy is not unique to US state legislatures, as shown by the ongoing
constitutional debate and reforms implemented in many national states.6
Do more complex legislative procedures really make lawmakers less vulnerable to lobby pres-
sures? What are the potential costs of such lengthy procedures? The existing literature has identi-
1As reported by the Center for Public Integrity, over one billion dollars was spent in 2005 to lobby state politicians.
Moreover, of the 2000 investigations on public corruption undertaken by the F.B.I. in 2006, most involve states and
local ocials (source: The New York Times May 11, 2006, F.B.I.'s Focus on Public Corruption Includes 2,000
Investigations)
2California unicameral legislature, October 4 2006, Attorney General File number 2600{034; State of New York
Bill 9875, February 5 2010.
3As Madison (1788) had pointed out \... a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from,
and dividing the power with, a rst, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security
to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perdy, where the
ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sucient"
4According to the New York unicameral bill proposal \A one house legislature will eliminate needless duplication
and delay (...); it will speed up the budget process and facilitate the adoption of timely budgets" (source: State of
New York, Bill Number A597, January 18 2005).
5Of course, bicameralism may also serve other purposes such as the representation of heterogenous interests that
in modern democracies are associated with geographically distinct political jurisdictions such as for example, federal
states. For a comprehensive view of bicameralism, see Tsebelis and Money (1997) and Voigt (2012). For an overview
on the eects of federalism and bicameralism on corruption see instead Rose-Ackerman (2006).
6For an overview of bicameral arrangements in national states and a cross-country empirical analysis on bicam-
eralism and corruption, see Testa (2010).
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ed legislative gridlock and status quo bias as the two main drawbacks of bicameralism (Riker 1992,
Levmore 1992, Muthoo and Shepsle 2008), and more generally of multiple veto players (Chang and
Tsebelis 2002, Tsebelis 1995, Franzese 2007). An additional { and so far understudied { drawback
of more complex procedures is that they typically require more time for legislation to be enacted,
and time is the ultimate scarce resource for an elected politician. \Hard" time constraints on leg-
islative decisions can typically arise because many bills compete for the attention of lawmakers, as
it has been emphasized by Cox (2006), or because some important pieces of legislation, like the
yearly budget, need to be approved within a specic time frame, under the threat of a complete
government shutdown if the ocial deadline is not met. More generally, the presence of time con-
straints introduces an additional source of uncertainty on the fate of legislative proposals, which
has important eects on the behavior of decision makers and, in particular, on their ability to resist
lobby pressures. In fact, there is growing anecdotal evidence on the frequency of `Christmas Tree'
appropriations or `Walking Around Money' (WAM), whereby earmarks are introduced into state
budgets to support projects put forward by politically connected institutions and organizations,
exploiting the threat of a government shutdown if the yearly budget is not approved by the ocial
deadline.7
The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework that takes explicitly into account
the role of time on legislative outcomes under alternative institutional arrangements to assess the
eects of the proposed reforms of bicameral legislatures. Contrary to the received wisdom, we argue
that long legislative procedures { like the ones brought about by a bicameral system { may shift
the balance of power in favor of pressure groups, making lobby capture easier rather than more
dicult.
In our analysis, private interests try to inuence policy by bargaining with legislators, and the
law making process is constrained by a nite number of legislative sessions. This allows us to ex-
plicitly consider the role played by the time necessary to pass legislation on the bargaining power
of legislators and thus on accountability. To keep our framework tractable, we focus on a single
powerful lobby bargaining with law makers during the legislative process, while citizens can only
punish/reward legislators in an election called at the end of the mandate to hold them account-
able. Thus, our model is particularly suited to describe those situations in which an organized
industry lobbies legislators, whereas unorganized groups { such as consumers or taxpayers { can
discipline politicians by means of elections. Comparing the eectiveness of unicameral and bicam-
eral arrangements, we nd that bicameralism does not necessarily improve electoral accountability.
7For instance during the weeks preceding the approval of the 2005 New York state budget, it has been pointed
out that \...winning on time passage from the legislature could be costly.... It might require Mr. Pataki to agree to
hundreds of millions of dollars in extra spending" (The Calendar vs. the Purse for Albany's Big 3 The New York
Times, March 16 2005). For more details on late budget procedures in US federal states see Eckl (1998).
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This is because, in a bicameral set-up, the increased pressure to undertake timely decisions can
have an adverse eect on the bargaining power of legislators. In particular, as the time necessary
to complete the entire legislative process is limited, failure by one body to deliberate early in the
process increases the risk that legislation will not gain passage. As a result, the legislator's outside
option deteriorates, leading to a weakening of his bargaining power vis a vis the lobby. Hence, when
legislators vote sequentially on a bill, an increase in the number of veto players does not necessarily
make lobbying more expensive. In particular, and in contrast to Diermeier and Myerson (1999),
we nd that the cost of buying legislators (the so called external hurdle factor) does not increase
monotonically with the number of legislative bodies. This result delivers an important warning on
the optimal allocation of legislative power from the point of view of voters: when time constraints
are binding, the fragmentation of decision making across multiple bodies may weaken legislators,
rendering lobby capture easier rather than more dicult.
On the other hand, when time constraints are not binding, bicameralism can have a positive eect
on accountability. Comparing dierent possible arrangements, we show that the best bicameral
system is the one in which equal decision powers are given to the two chambers (open rule with
restricted amendment rights). The system that attributes unrestricted amendment rights to the
second chamber is bad for incentives, as it is likely to generate a status quo bias. The closed rule
system { assigning proposal power to the rst legislator and veto power to the second { can instead
be ranked between the two previous alternatives.
Bicameralism is the subject of a recent, growing literature. Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo
(2007) and Druckman and Thies (2002) have studied the impact of multiple chambers on the
formation and stability of coalitional governments, whereas Hickey (2011) analyzes the eect of
bicameralism on the formation of federations. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ting (2003b) and Knight
(2008) analyze bargaining over the division of public expenditures in bicameral legislatures with
unequal representation. Bradbury and Crain (2001) and Heller (2001) have considered instead
the link between bicameralism and budget decit. All these studies do not analyze the impact
of legislative structures on electoral accountability, which is instead the focus of our paper. The
accountability problem in our set-up with multiple legislators is similar to the corruption deterrence
problem in agency models with multiple supervisors, who can collude with the agent they are
supposed to monitor (Kofman and Lawarree 1993, Kofman and Lawarree 1996 and Mishra 2002).
In particular, two chambers are akin to two supervisors in an horizonal structure. The main
dierence between supervisors and legislators is that the latter have substantive power, e.g. only
policy passed by legislators can subsequently be executed and generate prots for the lobby. As a
result, the eectiveness of dierent organizational structures on accountability hinges critically on
their impact on the legislators' bargaining position. In particular, the introduction of an additional
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chamber may make the collusion problem worse if the more complex organizational structure has a
negative bearing on the bargaining power of legislative bodies.
In order to combine elections, lobbying and legislative procedures, we extend the bargaining
literature8 endogenizing the identity of one of the players (the legislator), through the introduction
of an election stage.9 The approach we follow is similar to Testa (2010), which uses Nash bargaining
to model the interaction between elected legislators and organized interests. However, whereas
Testa (2010), similarly to Diermeier and Myerson (1999), nds that the cost of buying legislators
(the so called external hurdle factor) increases monotonically in the number of legislators with
aligned electoral concerns, this is not the case in our set-up. Thus, the sequential bargaining with
time constraints provides dierent important insights on the outcome of the legislative process.
As in Bernheim et al. (2006), we assume that the number of bargaining rounds is nite, but
dierently from them we focus on the negotiations taking place between lobby and legislators,
rather than on bargaining among law makers. In particular, similarly to Diermeier and Myerson
(1999) and Groseclose and Snyder (1996), we assume that a lobbyist can buy the legislators' vote
to obtain the implementation of a given policy, and we study how constitutional rules, aecting
the bargaining process, have an impact on the cost of buying legislators (external hurdle factor).
However, while Diermeier and Myerson (1999), taking the external hurdle factor as given, primarily
focus on how legislators can manipulate the internal organization of chambers (i.e. internal hurdle
factor) to extract higher payments from lobbyists, in our work we concentrate on constitutional
rules themselves to ask which institutional arrangements can prevent lobbyists and legislators from
nding agreements on policies that are detrimental to voters. Hence, in our model a powerful lobby
competes with voters (rather than with other interest groups) to sway the policy choice in its favor.
By incorporating lobbying into our analysis, we also obtain predictions on the relevance of
proposal power, which can bring larger rents to the legislators holding it. The importance of
proposal power has been stressed by models of distributive politics showing that it provides an
advantage in the so called \divide-the-dollar" bargaining (Baron and Ferejohn 1989, Cutrone and
McCarty 2006 and Ansolabehere et al. 2003a). Empirically, proposal power has been found to
secure legislators bigger shares of the budget (Knight 2005), more cabinets posts (Snyder et al.
2005) and larger campaign contributions (Grier and Munger 1993 and Romer and Snyder 1994).
Finally, since our theoretical framework shows how legislative rules and voting can be instrumen-
tal in disciplining legislators, our approach is also close to Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997).
8See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for a comprehensive survey, and Baron and Ferejohn (1989) for a pioneering
application of extensive form bargaining models to the legislative process.
9The literature on bicameral legislative bargaining typically does not incorporate elections. One exception is
Muthoo and Shepsle (2008) which lay out a model of optimal constitutional choice introducing elections in a reduced
form, i.e. without explicitly modeling the voting strategy.
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However, we depart from their contribution in an important way because we introduce lobbying
as the source of the agency problem, and explicitly analyze the bargaining between lobby and
legislators to understand the role played by alternative legislative procedures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and discusses
the main assumptions. In section 3 we characterize the equilibrium under unicameralism, while
section 4 deals with bicameralism and accountability under both an open rule and a closed rule
setting. Section 5 oers concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Policies and Preferences
Consider an economy composed by citizens indexed by k, legislators denoted by g and a lobby group
(private rm) l. The legislator g should be thought of as the ruling majority in a body that has the
authority to decide on a public policy p. In a unicameral parliament there is a unique legislator g,
whereas a bicameral legislature consists of two chambers requiring the agreement of two concurrent
legislators denoted by g1 and g2.
All agents in the economy derive a non-negative benet B from the implementation of the public
policy and share equally its cost, paying a per capita cost C 2 CL; CH	 with CH > CL = 0. The
policy maker has complete discretion on whether to choose a low cost policy (CL), a high cost one
(CH) or no policy (?), hence p 2 fCL; CH ;?g. He also enjoys delivering a policy, which can be
thought of as representing his legacy, denoted by E. We assume that the overall benet of the policy
for the politician always outweighs its cost (e.g. E + B > CH).10 At the same time, we assume
that all other citizens k will only benet from the policy as long as the low cost option is chosen,
e.g. CL < B < CH . Furthermore, the execution of the policy results in a prot (C) for the lobby
group l, which is increasing in C and generates a corresponding (net) rent (C) = [(C)   C] for
the group. For simplicity, we assume that (CH) =  > 0 and (CL) = 0, which implies that
citizens and the lobby have conicting interests over the policy: citizens benet only from the low
cost option, whereas the lobby benets more from the high cost one because, in this case, besides
B, they also obtain the rent  > 0. Hence, denoting by vj(p), with j = k; g; l the utility each agent
10The legacy motive represents a straightforward device to introduce non{pecuniary benets enjoyed by politicians
in power (Maskin and Tirole 2004). In a previous version of our paper (Facchini and Testa 2009), we had modeled
the same idea by assuming that politicians derive instead a positive utility from implementing their own ideological
agenda. While this allowed us to capture the role of political polarization, the main thrust of the analysis of
bicameralism is not aected.
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derives from a policy p, their preferences can be summarized follows:
vk(C
H) < vk(?) < vk(CL) (1)
vg(?) < vg(CH) < vg(CL) (2)
vl(?) < vl(CL) < vl(CH) (3)
Besides conicting interests over policies, lobby and citizens also dier because the former is an
organized group that can directly inuence the content of legislation by bargaining with the law-
makers, whereas the latter can only express their approval or disapproval by re{electing or not the
incumbent legislator. In the next section we will formally lay out the decision making process by
modeling the strategic interaction between the legislator, lobby and voters.
2.2 Lobbying and voting
The public policy is chosen in a game lasting for two periods t 2 f1; 2g, with  being the inter-
temporal discount rate.11 For legislation to be passed, a motion must be put on the oor during a
legislative session. In each period t lawmakers face time constraints in the form of a nite number
of legislative sessions s > 1. The legislator, interacting with voters and the lobby, decides whether
to implement a high cost policy (CH), a low cost policy (CL) or no policy (?). We start by
considering the case of a unicameral assembly. The timing of the game between legislator, lobby
and voters is as follows. At the beginning of the rst period, voters announce the voting strategy
and an exogenously appointed legislator convenes the rst legislative session. At the beginning of
the session, before any motion is put to the oor, the lobby can \bribe" the lawmaker to aect his
policy decision. The lobbying activity takes the form of a bargaining game where in t = 1 the lobby
is drawn to make the rst proposal, whereas in t = 2 the lobby and the legislator are randomly
assigned the right to make oers, respectively with probability q and 1   q, which are common
knowledge among the players. In this set-up, although the lobby enjoys a rst mover advantage,12
her ability to exploit it will crucially depend on how institutional rules shape the bargaining power
of legislators in future negotiations. In particular, this bargaining framework will allow us to study
11We focus on a nite horizon game because it represents the most dicult scenario for electoral accountability,
since in the last mandate politicians do not face elections. As in any nite horizon set up, the last period policy
choice is trivial, and the second period only serves the purpose of modeling in a simple way the future electoral
returns from current policy choices.
12The recent corruption charges against Jack Abramo, one of the most inuential lobbyists in Washington, has
sparkled a wide debate on the large amounts of resources spent to gain inuence on law making. As the Washington
Post (June 22, 2005) points out \... companies are also hiring well-placed lobbyists to go on the oensive and
nd ways to prot from the many tax breaks, loosened regulations and other government goodies that increasingly
are available." In fact, professional lobbyists are usually hired for the exclusive purpose of constantly approaching
legislators to promote the interests of their clients.
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which decision making process is best suited to limit the inuence of a powerful lobby on policy.
In the rst legislative session, if the lobby and the lawmaker nd an agreement to share the rent
from the policy, a motion is put to the oor and the agreed policy is passed. In case of disagreement,
the session adjourns with no policy approved, and the legislator can reconvene to unilaterally put a
new motion to the oor, and pass it. At the end of the rst period voters observe the implemented
policy and cast their ballots. In the second period, the elected legislator chooses again a policy
bargaining with the lobby as before and the game ends.
Denoting by tg the share of rent paid by the lobby to the legislator in period t, the one period
payo of citizens k, legislator g and lobby l associated with the bargaining game can be written as
follows:
vtk(?)  vtg(?)  vtl (?) = 0 (4)
vtk(C) = B   C (5)
vtl (C) = B + (1  tg) (6)
vtg(C) = B + E + 
t
g   C (7)
where C 2 fCL; CHg. Having described the lobbying process, we are now ready to lay out the
voting game. Each voter faces two candidates, the incumbent g, and an opponent g0. The two
candidates are identical in all regards, except that the incumbent has been in oce in the rst
term. Restricting our analysis to pure strategies, we dene a voting strategy for the representative
voter as a mapping from the rst period policy choice p1 to a voting decision,  : p1 ! f0; 1g,
where  = 1 means that he re-elects the incumbent g, whereas  = 0 indicates instead that he
elects the opponent g0. We follow Ferejohn (1986) and assume that at the beginning of the rst
period the representative voter { given his expectations about the legislator's and lobby behavior
{ chooses a voting rule that maximizes his inter-temporal utility. Furthermore, the voting strategy
must be sub-game perfect, i.e. we consider only rewards/punishments that can be credibly carried
out once the rst period policy has been chosen, so that the voting strategy is consistent with both
retrospective and prospective voting. Hence, similarly to Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997), we
focus on a simple voting strategy that has the property of selecting the best possible equilibrium
from the point of view of the voters.13 With the additional requirement that the strategies played
by the legislator and lobby satisfy sub-game perfection, in the next sections we characterize the
equilibrium of the game.
13Simple retrospective voting strategies that are widely used in the political economy literature, also have the
advantage of being plausible since they receive substantial empirical support (Fiorina 1981) and their adoption by the
electorate can be thought of as the result of simple conventions due to social norms (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
1997).
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3 A unicameral system
The analysis of a unicameral system is a useful benchmark to evaluate how a legislator responds
to monetary and electoral incentives. Using backward induction, we start by characterizing the
share of rents that induces him to choose the high or the low cost policy in the second period.
Remembering that in case of disagreement the chamber can re-convene at least for another session
(e.g. s > 1) and unilaterally choose the low cost policy (CL), the second period disagreement
payos accruing to the legislator and lobby are:
v2g(C
L) = B + E (8)
v2l (C
L) = B (9)
whereas in case of agreement they are given by:
v2g(C
H) = B + E + 2g   CH (10)
v2l (C
H) = B + (1  2g ) (11)
As we can immediately see, any share 2g  C
H

will induce g to choose the high cost policy, and the
equilibrium shares depend on the bargaining power of the players, i.e. on their right to make oers.
If the lobby moves rst, then in equilibrium the share of rents paid to the legislator is 2g = C
H=,
whereas if the legislator moves rst 2g = 1.
In the rst period, the threat of losing elections makes the policy choice more interesting because,
as we will formally show later, in equilibrium the legislator is re-elected only if he does not choose the
high cost policy. More formally, consider the following conjectured voting strategy  = [(CH) =
0; (CL) = 1; (?) = 1]. First, we characterize the optimal behaviour of a legislator in response
to  (Proposition 1); then we show that  is an equilibrium voting strategy (Lemma 2). Given
, the following holds
Lemma 1 In t = 1; any share 1g < 
1
g implements the low cost policy C
L, and any share 1g  
1
g
implements the high cost policy CH , where 
1
g =
CH+[E+q+(1 q)CH ]

.
Proof. First note that in case of disagreement, the legislator can unilaterally choose his most
preferred policy. Thus, if in t = 2 the legislator is the proposer, he can extract the entire prot .
On the other hand, if the lobby is the proposer, she will have to oer the legislator a transfer CH ,
which makes him indierent between accepting the oer and rejecting it to get the outside option
B + E. Thus, moving backward to the rst period, the legislator knows that his expected second
period payo from re-election will be q(B + E +    CH) + (1   q)(B + E). Hence, the payo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from rejecting the lobby oer and winning elections is B + E + [q(   CH) + B + E], whereas
the payo from accepting the lobby oer and losing elections is B + E + 1g   CH + (B   CH).
Therefore, the minimum share inducing the legislator to accept the lobby oer in the rst period is

1
g =
CH+[E+q+(1 q)CH ]

. 
The critical share 
1
g depends on the per capita cost C
H the legislator pays in the rst mandate,
the second period legacy E, and the lobby transfer [q+(1 q)CH ] he expects to receive in the second
mandate if re-elected. In other words, the legislator is willing to choose the high cost policy and not
be re-elected if the lobby transfer net of per capita costs in the rst mandate compensates him for
the electoral loss consisting of giving up future lobby transfers and the utility from leaving a legacy.
Note that if  < CH the legislator will never choose the high cost policy, because the minimum
transfer CH he is ready to accept is not aordable for the lobby. Hence, electoral accountability is
at risk only when   CH . As this is the interesting case, in the rest of the paper we will assume
this restriction to hold. We are now ready to characterize the policy choice in the rst mandate in
the following:
Proposition 1 During the rst mandate if E  1 q

 
   CH CH , the high cost policy is chosen,
while if E > 1 q

 
   CH  CH , the low cost policy is chosen.
Proof. From lemma 1, we know that 1g = 
1
g is the minimum payment that makes the incumbent
legislator (weakly) better o by agreeing to implement CH in exchange for 
1
g in the rst mandate.
As rst mover, the lobby will oer the minimum payment the legislator will accept provided that
it is feasible. This requires 
1
g  1, which is true if and only if E  1 q
 
   CH  CH . 
The condition E  1 q

 
   CH   CH is a feasibility requirement on the minimum share
inducing the legislator and the lobby to agree on the high cost policy, and it depends on the
legislator non-monetary benet from delivering a policy and on the bargaining power of the players.
As 1 q

 
   CH decreases with q, the legislator is more likely to be accountable to voters the
larger is his bargaining power vis a vis the lobby. Interestingly, if q = 1 and the future is not
discounted ( = 1), even a small legacy E will be sucient to make the politician accountable.
Having characterized the equilibrium in the bargaining game, we can now show that:
Lemma 2 The voting strategy  = [(CH) = 0; (CL) = 1; (?) = 1] is an equilibrium voting
strategy.
Proof. See appendix. 
To understand the intuition for this result, note that in the last period the incumbent's behavior
does not depend on the voting strategy, because the game ends and he cannot be punished or
rewarded by the voters. Hence, the rule that maximizes the voter's inter-temporal utility must
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induce the legislator to choose a policy in the voter's interest at least in the rst period. A rule
that punishes the incumbent if he chooses the worse policy for voters (CH) and rewards him if
he does not, achieves this objective. Note that this strategy satises sub-game perfection since it
makes the voter (weakly) better o at any time, i.e. before and after the rst period policy has
been chosen. Hence, although any other voting strategy would give the voter the same utility in
the second period, there is no alternative voting strategy that would induce a better policy choice
in the rst period.14 Therefore, similarly to Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997), we adopt the
renement proposed by Ferejohn (1986) that selects a voting strategy delivering the best possible
equilibrium from the point of voters which in our case allows to achieve accountability at least in
one period.
4 Bicameralism
In this section we analyze the impact of bicameralism on electoral accountability. In particular, we
explore the eect of alternative institutional rules regulating the two legislative bodies. Intuitively,
introducing multiple chambers makes lobbying more costly, since more decision makers need to be
compensated for the implementation of an unpopular policy. At the same time, the creation of
additional steps in the legislative process is likely to increase the time span needed for the policy
to be adopted, thus putting at risk the passage of legislation when time is a scarce resource. As a
result, a more subtle consequence of having multiple chambers is that the legislators' outside options
in the bargaining with the lobby may be worsened. Hence, a complex legislative procedure, besides
wasting hours of legislators' time in multiple deliberative sessions, can also increase the ability of
the pressure group to inuence the decision making process, and make the accountability problem
more severe. In what follows we will show how these forces play out under two dierent institutional
arrangements commonly adopted in democracies, i.e. the closed rule and the open rule system. In
the former, after the rst body has proposed a policy, the other chamber only enjoys veto power.
In the latter, all chambers are symmetric in the sense of being able to introduce amendments to the
original proposal. In this paper we focus on bicameralism, but our results easily extend to multiple
veto players and can nd a variety of alternative applications. For instance, they can be used to
understand the role of presidential veto power or to evaluate provisions like the \emergency brake"
rule which was proposed in the EU constitution draft.15
14Note though that, as shown in the proof of Lemma 2, the alternative voting strategy [000(CH) = 0; 000(CL) =
1; 000(?) = 0] would deliver the same payo for the voters.
15This rule would have allowed a member country, that had been outvoted on a proposal in Parliament, to ask
for a new vote in the Council. This would have been equivalent to a system where the rst body (Parliament) has
proposal power and the second (Council) has nal decision power.
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Before proceeding we need to adapt our notation to accommodate the more complex structure
of the game. To this end, assume that the legislative process requires the sequential approval of
two chambers denoted by gd with d = 1; 2. The lobby can inuence legislation by bargaining with
the body that is due to convene to approve the policy. As before, in t = 1 the lobby moves rst,
whereas in t = 2 she remains a proposer with probability q. In each mandate t, chamber g1 initiates
the legislative process, and thus the lobby l starts the bargaining with g1 by making a rst oer,
which can be accepted or rejected. In the former case, the agreed legislation is put on the oor
and passed in the rst legislative session. In the latter, the disagreement payos are determined
by the policy unilaterally chosen by the legislator. Once the bargaining between the lobby and the
rst lawmaker is over, the legislation passes to the next chamber g2, with whom the lobby starts
a new bargaining game, with the same structure. Importantly, the policy that each chamber can
pass (and the agreement that the lobby can reach with each legislative body) crucially depends on
the allocation of legislative powers. During each mandate t, the rst chamber that has proposal
power can choose any policy pt 2 fCL; CH ;?g. As for chamber g2, if it has only veto power (closed
rule system) it can only ratify the policy chosen by the rst chamber or veto it. If the second
chamber enjoys instead amendment rights (open rule system), the set of feasible policies coincides
with pt 2 fCL; CH ;?g.
It is worth noting that, for a policy to be implemented in a bicameral setting, deliberation by
each chamber is required, which implies that more time is necessary to pass a bill. This may have
an important eect on the legislators' outside options. With a single legislative body, should the
bargaining break down, the legislator can always implement his most preferred policy. This is no
longer guaranteed in a bicameral set-up, because if the bargaining between a given chamber and the
lobby breaks down, the policy unilaterally chosen by the rst chamber must still be approved by the
other legislative body. As a result, when the time necessary to complete the entire legislative process
is limited, no legislation might end up being approved, and this will lead to a deterioration of the
legislator's outside option. In our set-up, we say that the legislature operates under a binding time
constraint when failure to pass a policy in the rst session implies that no policy is implemented.
Formally, let (D), with 0  (D)  1, denote the probability that, when deliberation is not
achieved in the rst legislative session, there will not be enough time for a bill to be approved by
D legislators. With a single legislator the time constraint is not binding ((1) = 0) since he can
always obtain immediate passage of a bill. On the other hand, with multiple legislators the time
constraint can become binding ((D)  0 for D > 1) and, the larger is the number of bodies that
needs to approve the bill, the higher is the probability that this will be the case, i.e. @(D)
@D
> 0. For
simplicity, since our analysis focuses on bicameralism, we assume that (2) =  with 0    1,
but the results easily extend to the more general set up with multiple legislators.
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Denoting by tgd the share of prots received by each legislator bargaining with the lobby, the
one period payo to the various agents are given by:
vtk(?)  vtgd(?)  vtl (?) = 0 (12)
vtk(C) = B + E   C (13)
vtl (C) = B + (1 
2X
d=1
tgd) (14)
vtgd(C) = B + E + 
t
gd
   C (15)
We focus again on a simple retrospective voting strategy where the voter decides to re-elect the two
incumbent legislators based on the nal policy outcome. Hence, the voting strategy is a mapping
 : p1 ! f0; 1g where  = 1 indicates that the incumbents will be re-elected, whereas  = 0 means
instead that they are replaced by the opponents.16
As in the unicameral case, we look for a sub-game perfect equilibrium. In the remainder of
the paper we focus on the characterization of the equilibrium of the bargaining game, given the
conjectured voting strategy  = [(CH) = 0; (CL) = 1; (?) = 1], which in turn can be shown
to be an equilibrium voting strategy, following the same argument as in the unicameral case.17
4.1 Closed rule
We begin our analysis by considering the case where the rst legislator has proposal power, and
the second can only pass or veto previously approved proposals. The rent shares that legislators
are able to extract bargaining with the lobby depend both on their outside options and on the
institutional environment in which they operate. Outside options are aected by the time available
to legislate, because when the latter is limited, the bargaining power of multiple legislators can be
hindered. As for the legislators' institutional rights, under closed rule, the rst legislator enjoys a
substantial advantage that will be reected in a rent share larger than that extracted by the second
chamber. As before, the policy choice in the second period is trivial since the high cost policy is
16As pointed out in the literature (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997) the advantage of a retrospective voting
strategy conditioning on the last policy outcome is its simplicity. Moreover, in the context of our complex decision
making process, it has the additional benet of allowing the voter to hold multiple legislators accountable even if he
does not punish or reward them dierently when they undertake dierent actions.
17See Lemma A1 and A3 in the appendix. Note that our simple voting strategy  conditions on the nal
policy outcome, rather than on the behavior of each individual chamber. Alternatively, one could consider a more
complex voting strategy, which would make the re-election of a given legislator dependent on the specic action he
has undertaken, rather than only on the nal policy outcome. Note that { as argued in Remark 1 in the Appendix
{ this more complex voting strategy does not allow the voter to obtain accountability if the latter cannot be already
reached using our simple voting strategy. For this reason we focus the analysis on our simple voting strategy, which
has the additional advantage of requiring less information on the entire policy formation process on the side of the
voter.
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always chosen.18 Hence, focusing on the rst period we can show that:
Lemma 3 In t = 1 the minimum shares of rent required by each legislator gd to choose the high cost
policy are 
1
g1
= 
1
g   [1 + (1   q)] (B+E) and 
1
g2
= C
H+E (B+E)

, with 
1
g =
CH+[E+q+(1 q)CH ]

.
Furthermore, 
1
g1
> 
1
g2
.
Proof. See Appendix. 
This result illustrates two important points. First, it shows how the distribution of proposal
and veto powers has an impact on the cost of buying each chamber. Second, it establishes how the
time constraints, by worsening the legislators' outside options, inuence the cost of lobbying.
Proposal power matters. As in the unicameral case, legislators require a minimum transfer
that should compensate them for both the \monetary" and \non-monetary" losses incurred in the
second period by pleasing the lobby rather than the electorate. However, while both legislators
suer non-monetary losses if they are voted out of oce, only the legislator with proposal power -
who enjoys the possibility of extracting rents in the second period - suers a monetary loss. As a
result, the rst chamber requires a larger transfer than the second, which only enjoys veto power.19
Importantly, the compensation required by the chamber holding proposal power depends on the
time constraints aecting its outside options. In particular, if time constraints are not binding
( = 0), the rst chamber can credibly threaten to reject the lobby oer since it can unilaterally
implement the low cost policy and thus extract the same rent share as in the unicameral case.
On the other hand, if the time constraint is binding ( > 0), the rst legislator's outside option
is worsened, because a rejection of the lobby's proposal could result in a failure to approve any
legislation by the end of the mandate. In particular, in the rst period, if the rst chamber rejects
the lobby oer, with probability  no legislation will be passed, thus implying an expected non-
monetary (policy) loss (B + E). In the second period, when the lobby will be a proposer with
probability (1   q), a rejection of the lobby's oer implies again that with probability  no policy
will be implemented, and the expected loss from disagreement will be (1  q)(B+E). As a result,
18As for the equilibrium shares of prots, in the second period, if the legislator is the proposer, then 2g1 = 1, if
the lobby is the proposer then 2g1 =
CH (B+E)
 . On the other hand, the second legislator, who cannot credibly us
his veto in the second period, always gets 2g2 = 0. Note that although the lobby's outside option is worsened by the
risk of binding time constraints, still the lobby always prefers agreement to disagreement. For this reason  does not
aect the share of prots paid to the lobby when g1 is the proposer. See also the proof of Lemma 3 in the appendix.
19The asymmetry between the two chambers depends on the allocation of proposal powers, which in our setup
lies with the rst legislator. In an alternative setting, in which in the second period g1 retains proposal power only
with probability p, then the minimum shares of rent required by the two legislators to choose the high cost policy in
t = 1 are ^1g1 = 
1
g1   (1  p)fq + (1  q)C
H (B+E)
 g and ^1g2 = 
1
g2 + (1  p)[q + (1  q)C
H (B+E)
 ] (see Lemma
A1 in the Appendix). As we can immediately see, ^1g1  
1
g1 , whereas ^
1
g2  
1
g2 , i.e. if both chambers retain some
proposal power in the second period, the dierence in the minimum prot share they require to pass the high cost
policy declines. We would like to thank a referee for suggesting this extension.
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the risk of binding time constraints reduces the transfer from the lobby to the legislator by the
amount [1 + (1  q)](B + E).
How does bicameralism aect accountability? If time constraints are non-binding (i.e.  =
0), the rst legislator requires a minimum share of prots coinciding with that demanded in a
unicameral system (i.e. 
1
g1
= 
1
g), and the second one requires a non-negative share. As a result,
in the bicameral context policymakers will receive a share of prots which is at least as large as in
the unicameral system i.e.
2P
d=1

1
gd
 1g, implying that the cost of lobbying increases monotonically
with the number of legislators.20 On the other hand, when time constraints bind with a positive
probability ( > 0), the loss of bargaining power for the rst legislator constitutes an important
drawback of a multi-chamber system, which can work against the interest of the electorate. In this
case, we can establish the following non monotonicity result:
Lemma 4 Let 0 <   1. If 1g2  [1 + (1  q)]B+E , then two legislators do not require a larger
share of rents than a single legislator, whereas the opposite holds if 
1
g2
> [1 + (1  q)]B+E

.
Proof. Remember that 
1
g1
= 
1
g   [1 + (1   q)]B+E . Therefore, 
1
g1
+ 
1
g2
> 
1
g , 
1
g2
>
[1 + (1  q)]B+E

. 
Intuitively, in a bicameral system more legislators need to be bribed by the lobby than in a
unicameral system. At the same time, the compensation required by the rst legislator decreases,
because of its inability to credibly reject a lobby proposal, given the presence of binding time
constraints. Hence, only when the transfer paid to the second legislator more than compensates the
decrease in bargaining power of the rst, the cost of lobbying increases with the number of legislators,
making multiple chambers potentially more accountable to voters. Thus, if the legislator without
proposal power commands a zero minimum prot share in the bargaining with the lobby (
1
g2
= 0),
then the only eect of the more complex decision making process is to reduce the bargaining
power of the rst legislator, thus making lobby capture easier.21 This result contrasts with the
ndings of Diermeier and Myerson (1999), where the so called external hurdle factor 22 increases
instead monotonically with the number of decision makers. Thus, our analysis highlights a potential
drawback of increasing the number of legislative bodies and provides a potential rationale for current
reform proposals aiming for shorter and simpler legislative procedures in US federal states.
20We focus on the cost of lobbying deriving from the electoral loss of multiple legislators because we are mainly
interested in electoral incentives. However, it should be clear that having multiple chambers deciding sequentially
rather than simultaneously can have a substantial impact on the lobby's ability to bribe the legislator whenever
lobbying is a costly, time consuming activity or the rents associated to an agreement decrease over time. Hence,
our results on the positive eect of bicameralism on accountability hold a fortiori if we introduce either a cost of
lobbying or a prot that are time dependent.
21Note that if there is uncertainty in the allocation of proposal power in the second period { see footnote 19 {
the second chamber can extract a larger rent, and thus the scenario in which bicameralism decreases accountability
is less likely.
22Expressing the diculty of buying legislators.
14
We are now ready to compare policy choices under a unicameral and a bicameral arrangement.
Since if 
1
g2
= 0 bicameralism is unambiguously worse than unicameralism, in the remainder of the
analysis we focus on the the alternative case (e.g. 
1
g2
> 0). The next result fully characterizes the
conditions under which legislators are accountable to voters:
Proposition 2 Comparing a unicameral and a bicameral system, the following holds:
i) Non-binding time constraint ( = 0). If 
1
g <
2P
d=1

1
gd
< 1, then legislators are never accountable,
whereas if
2P
d=1

1
gd
> 
1
g > 1 they are always accountable. If instead 
1
g < 1 <
2P
d=1

1
gd
then
legislators are accountable under bicameralism only.
ii) Binding time constraint (0 <   1). If 1g <
2P
d=1

1
gd
< 1 then legislators are never accountable,
whereas for 
1
g >
2P
d=1

1
gd
> 1 or
2P
d=1

1
gd
> 
1
g > 1, they are always accountable. Finally, if
2P
d=1

1
gd
< 1 < 
1
g then legislators are accountable under a unicameral arrangement only, whereas
if 
1
g < 1 <
2P
d=1

1
gd
they are accountable only under bicameralism.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 2 points out that while under several congurations of the parameters unicameralism
and bicameralism deliver the same policy outcomes, there are two cases where one type of legislative
arrangement can be clearly ranked above the other in terms of electoral accountability. First, if the
minimum rent share legislators are willing to accept under unicameralism is feasible and smaller
than the non-feasible share under bicameralism (
1
g < 1 <
2P
d=1

1
gd
), then we have the traditional
Madisonian argument in favor of bicameralism, i.e. while one chamber can be easily corrupted, the
cost of buying two chambers is so high that accountability can be achieved. However, this outcome
is possible only insofar as multiple legislators retain bargaining power. Hence, when binding time
constraints do not allow all chambers to extract rents, then bicameralism will in fact have an
opposite eect on accountability. By increasing the time necessary to pass legislation, a bicameral
system can decrease the minimum rent shares legislators are willing to accept up to the point where
multiple chambers can be bought by the lobby, whereas a single one remains accountable to the
electorate (
2P
d=1

1
gd
< 1 < 
1
g). Hence, our model delivers an important caveat on adding multiple
legislative steps in the law making process, since long and complex legislative procedures may
ultimately weaken legislators and hurt voters. This result provides an important rationale for the
unicameral proposals currently being discussed in several US states advocating the abolition of time
consuming legislative procedures. While these proposals just point out that abolishing redundant
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legislative sessions will save hours of wasted legislators' time, our analysis uncovers that there is a
more profound meaning to the `value of time' in a legislative process because, when law-makers are
less pressured by time constraints, their bargaining power as well as their electoral accountability
can be enhanced.
4.2 Open rule
In a closed rule setting, amendment rights are ruled out and the power to choose the content of
the new legislation is given entirely to the chamber initiating the process, whereas the subsequent
legislators can only decide whether to approve or not the initial proposal. Under an open rule all
legislators can actually modify the original policy, i.e. they enjoy amendment rights. Since the
rst chamber will anticipate this possibility, the existence of amendment rights is likely to have an
important eect. To isolate the role of alternative allocations of proposal power, in this section
we concentrate for simplicity on the case where time constraints are non-binding (i.e.  = 0) and
analyze dierent forms of open rule. We consider both the case of unrestricted amendment rights,
i.e. the situation in which the policy passed by the previous chamber can unilaterally be modied
by the subsequent legislators, and the situation in which the amendments introduced require the
approval of all legislators (restricted amendment rights). In both cases, the second chamber can
only amend a legislative proposal passed by the rst; in other words, it does not have the power to
initiate the legislative process.23 If no legislation is passed in the rst chamber, then the mandate
ends with no policy implemented.
The following lemma characterizes the minimum prot shares 
1
gd
required by each legislator gd
to implement the high cost policy in the rst period under restricted and unrestricted amendment
rights:24
Lemma 5 In period t = 1, if amendment rights are restricted, the minimum share required to
choose the high cost policy are 
1
gd
= C
H+E+[q+(1 q)CH ]

for all gd. If amendment rights are unre-
stricted, the minimum shares are instead given by 
1
g1
= C
H+E (B+E)

and 
1
g2
= C
H+E+[q+(1 q)CH ]

.
Proof. See Appendix. 
It is important to point out that under restricted amendment rights, since both chambers must
agree on any amendment to the original proposal, the two bodies are able to extract the same
23This type of arrangement is very common. For instance, in the US only the House of Representatives can initiate
budget legislation.
24Remember that in the second period the high cost policy will always be chosen. As for the prot shares, in
t = 2, if amendment rights are restricted, the equilibrium prot shares are 2gd = q + (1   q)C
H
 for all gd, withP2
d=1 
2
gd
 1. If amendment rights are instead unrestricted, 2g1 = 0, whereas 2g2 = q + (1   q)C
H
 . See proof in
appendix.
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prots shares from the lobby. This nding is very dierent from the result obtained in the closed
rule system, where the rst legislator, who enjoys proposal power, can extract a larger rent.
On the other hand, with unrestricted amendment rights, the second legislator, who is in a
position to unilaterally change the policy passed by the rst, can extract a larger share of rents.
Hence, compared to the closed rule case, where the rst legislator is advantaged, the power of
legislators and their rent extraction are reversed. Moreover it is important to note that besides
dierences in the shares of rent extracted by legislators in the second period, the allocation of
proposal power aects also the `non-prot' component of the compensation that must be paid to
every legislator in the rst period in order to induce them to choose the high cost policy. Given
these dierences, we can compare the policy outcomes under open and closed rules systems. Our
results are summarized in the next
Proposition 3 The following holds:
i) If the low cost policy is chosen under closed rule then the low cost policy is chosen also under
open rule, while the reverse is not true.
ii) Assume that 0 < 
1
gd
< 1 and
P2
d=1 
1
gd
> 1. Then, if amendment rights are unrestricted, the
low cost policy is chosen under closed rule, whereas the status quo policy (?) prevails under
open rule. If amendment rights are restricted, the low cost policy is always chosen.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The intuition for the rst part of the proposition is quite straightforward. Under open rule (with
both restricted and unrestricted amendment rights) the total share of prots the lobby needs to pay
to legislators is at least as high as under closed rule. Hence, it might well be that under the open
rule system legislators are accountable, whereas they are not under a closed rule. When amendment
rights are unrestricted, there are also some additional policy implications, which arise if the lobby
cannot aord paying all legislators. Interestingly, when the lobby can only pay one legislator,
unrestricted amendment rights imply that the status quo (p = ?) is implemented, whereas under
the closed rule or restricted amendment rights the low cost policy will be chosen. In other words,
when the lobby cannot aord paying multiple legislators and the nal legislator can unilaterally
change a previously approved proposal, a status quo bias arises. The rst legislator prefers not
approving any proposal rather than passing a low cost policy that can be turned into a high cost one
by the last decision maker, when he is bribed by the lobby. The problem of the potential status quo
bias associated with multiple legislators has been stressed by other authors.25 However, dierently
from the existing literature, our analysis emphasizes that this risk is real only when subsequent
25See for instance Tsebelis and Money (1997).
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legislators are given more power than the rst one, as in the case of unrestricted amendment rights.
On the other hand, if amendment rights are restricted, then situations of legislative impasse can be
avoided. This factor seems to have been taken into account in the design of many legislative bodies
around the world, in which amendments implemented by the second chamber need to be approved
by the rst chamber as well.26
To complete our discussion of bicameralism and accountability, we would like to briey consider
another example in which bicameralism turns out to be neutral. Suppose that for a given economic
environment, the policy preferred by the lobby is the status quo, while the voters prefer instead a
dierent policy. In this case, with a bicameral system, voters need the approval of two legislative
bodies to see the implementation of their preferred policy, while the lobby will be satised by the
negative decision of just one chamber. It is then clear that the existence of a second legislator does
not have any eect since the cost of lobbying does not change compared to the one chamber case.
In other words, policy choices implemented by negative decisions are \cheaper" to buy than policy
choices requiring a positive decision. Therefore, if the lobby supports the status quo, increasing the
number of legislators does not help solving the accountability problem.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a theoretical framework to analyze the eects of bicameralism on
lawmakers' accountability to the public. In particular, inspired by the current debate on constitu-
tional reform in several US states, we have considered how the number of legislative chambers and
the allocation of powers among them can discipline elected representatives and limit the ability of
pressure groups to buy inuence. To that end, we have built a model in which legislators interact
with a lobby group through a bargaining process, and with voters by means of elections.
Our analysis delivers two important messages that should be taken into account in designing
reforms of the legislative process. First, the greater complexity induced by an additional chamber
may come with an undesirable eect, i.e. the loss of bargaining power for the elected body vis-a-
vis the lobby. Additional steps increase the time necessary to pass legislation. Hence, when the
chambers have limited time to deliberate, their ability to enact legislation may be put at risk.
When this happens, the outside options of legislators become worse and bicameralism might well
have a detrimental eect on accountability. On the other hand, if time constraints are not binding,
26In most countries, this means that the text of a bill needs to be approved in the same form by both legislative
bodies. Hence, in case of disagreement, the bill shuttles between the two chambers until an agreement is reached.
However, in extreme cases of complete parliamentary deadlock, other mechanisms have been devised. For instance,
in the US a conference committee can be called where delegates from each chamber meet to nd a compromise. For
more details see Tsebelis and Money (1997).
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a larger number of legislative bodies may increase the cost of lobbying and, therefore, enhance
electoral accountability. If this is the case, the second important message of our analysis is that the
eectiveness of a bicameral system crucially depends on the rules governing the two elected bodies,
and in particular the allocation of the decision power between the chambers. For accountability
purposes, the best incentives are provided whenever two legislative bodies share equal decision
powers (i.e. restricted amendment rights). Having instead unrestricted amendment rights can
result in a status quo bias, whereby no new legislation is passed.
The debate on the eectiveness of bicameral as opposed to unicameral arrangements is not unique
to US state legislatures. National states such as Germany and Italy have been considering reforms
of their parliamentary bodies to reduce the power of the Senate, whereas the UK proposal to render
the Lords an elected body with substantive legislative powers pushed in the opposite direction. The
role of the Council of states in the European Union and its potential to act as a second chamber,
in addition to the existing parliament, is also one of the many controversial issues surrounding the
drafting of the EU constitution. How far can we go in applying our analysis of bicameralism to these
alternative contexts? Dierently from sub-national state legislatures, national and federal legislative
bodies, besides the yearly budget approval, often deal with matters of constitutional relevance or
important reforms of general interest, for which time constraints are typically not binding. In this
case a more complex process does not translate in more lobby capture, while the scrutiny by two
bodies might provide better expertise and more careful deliberation. Thus, if bicameralism is to be
advantageous, its role could be conned to matters of general interest for which timely deliberations
are not a priority. More research is necessary though to formally establish how dierent tasks should
be allocated to decision-makers.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 2
Note that in the second period the high cost policy is always chosen. Hence, we conclude that to
show whether the voter's expected payo is maximized by , we only need to analyze the rst
period payo for all . Let us start by considering the following alternative strategy
0 = [0(CH) = 1; 0(CL) = 1; 0(?) = 1]
Under 0, the high cost policy is preferred by any legislator receiving gd  0, since he can receive
lobby transfers and choose his most preferred policy in both periods. On the other hand, under the
voting strategy  depending on the parameters of the model, the legislator will choose either CH
or CL. If CH is chosen, then the expected payo under the two alternative strategies is the same.
On the other hand, if CL is chosen then the voter prefers  to 0. Hence, we conclude that 0 is
not an equilibrium strategy. Consider next the following alternative strategy
00 = [00(CH) = 0; 00(CL) = 0; 00(?) = 0]
Under this voting strategy the incumbent is never reappointed. Therefore, since CH generates a
higher net prot to be shared, the legislator will always choose CH . Hence, 00 is not an equilibrium
voting strategy and more generally, by the same arguments, any strategy such that either (CH) = 1
or (CL) = 0, cannot be an equilibrium voting strategy. Finally, consider the strategy
000 = [000(CH) = 0; 000(CL) = 1; 000(?) = 0]
Note that, as v1g(C
L) > v1g(?), if the legislator does not receive transfers from the lobby, he always
implements CL, i.e. CL is the outside option. Since in the bargaining game the legislator chooses
between CH and the outside option CL, any voting strategy that punishes or rewards him for not
choosing any policy does not aect his behavior and thus the policy outcome. As a result, the voter
is indierent between  and 000. 
B Proof of Lemma 3
In t = 2 the following holds. Under a closed rule arrangement, the second legislator can only approve
or veto the policy chosen by the rst. Furthermore, since v2g2(C
H) > v2g2(?) 82g2 , vetoing is not
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credible. As a consequence, if in t = 2 the lobby can induce the rst legislator to choose CH , then
she does not need to pay any positive transfer to convince the second to pass CH . Hence, 2g2 = 0.
We can now determine the equilibrium transfers inducing the rst legislator to choose CH . Given
that the time constraint is binding with probability , in case of disagreement, g1 outside option
is v2g1(?) + (1   )(B + E), and the lobby's outside option is v2l (?) + (1   )B. Remembering
that v2l (?) = v2g1(?) = 0, then the rst legislator prefers agreement to disagreement if and only
if 2g1  C
H (B+E)

, whereas the lobby always prefers agreement. Hence, if the rst legislator is
the proposer then 2g1 = 1, if the lobby is the proposer then 
2
g1
= C
H (B+E)

, and CH is always
chosen. Moving to t = 1, and remembering that in t = 2 the rst legislator is the proposer with
probability q and the lobby is the proposer with probability 1   q, the second period expected
payo for g1 is

(B + E   CH) + q + (1  q)[CH   (B + E)]	. Hence, if in the rst period the
rst legislator rejects the rst lobby oer, he obtains the disagreement payo v1g1(?)+(1 )(B+
E) + 

(B + E   CH) + q + (1  q)[CH   (B + E)]	, whereas the agreement payo is given by
B + E   CH + 1g1 + (B   CH). Hence, agreement is preferred to disagreement if and only if
1g1  C
H+[E+q+(1 q)CH ]

  [1 + (1  q)]B+E

.
As for the second legislator, since 2g2 = 0, his disagreement payo is v
1
g2
(?)+

(B + E   CH),
whereas his payo from agreement is B+E CH + 1g2+ (B CH). Hence the second legislator
can credibly threaten to veto the proposal passed by g1, unless he receives 
1
g2
= C
H+E (B+E)

. On
the other hand, if E

+ C
H (B+E)

< 0, g2 cannot credibly veto any policy chosen by g1 and therefore

1
g2
= 0.
Finally, note that 
1
g1
> 
1
g2
if and only if (1  )(B+E)+ fq+(1  q)[CH   (B+E)]g  0,
which is always true because the second term is the expected lobby transfer, which is always weakly
positive. 
C Lemma A1
Lemma A1 Under closed rule, the voting strategy  = [(CH) = 0; (CL) = 1; (?) = 1] is
the unique equilibrium voting strategy.
Proof. Since the voting strategy depends only on the policy outcome, the optimality of the voting
strategy relies on the same arguments as in the unicameral case. In particular,  is an equilibrium
voting strategy since the voter is strictly better o by choosing  than under any alternative
strategy 0 such that either 0(CH) = 1 or 0(CL) = 0. Moreover, under closed rule this is the
unique equilibrium voting strategy because  = [(CH) = 0; (CL) = 1; (?) = 1] is strictly
preferred to 0 = [0(CH) = 0; 0(CL) = 1; 0(?) = 0], since punishing or rewarding the legislators
for not implementing any policy is not pay-o irrelevant. In fact, under 0, the second legislator
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cannot extract any rent since he cannot credibly veto any policy. This implies that CH is more
likely to be chosen because the feasibility constraint on lobby transfers is more easily satised when
g2 = 0. Hence the voter strictly prefers 
 to 0. 
Remark 1 Consider an alternative voting strategy 0gd whereby each legislator gd is re-elected based
on the policy he has passed and 0gd = [
0
gd
(CH) = 0; 0gd(C
L) = 1; 0gd(?) = 1]. Note that if each
legislator passes the same policy, 0gd delivers the same outcome as 
. Consider now the case where
the two legislators pass dierent policies. Since the second legislator can only veto the policy passed
by the rst, the only relevant scenario is the one in which the rst legislator chooses C 2 fCL; CHg
and the second vetoes it so that no policy is passed. Since if the rst legislator chooses CL, the
second will always pass it, we only need to consider the case in which the rst legislator chooses CH
and the second vetoes it. In this case under the voting strategy  both legislators are re-elected,
whereas under the voting strategy 0gd , only the second legislator is re-elected. We can easily see
that, given , if the rst legislator chooses CH , which is subsequently vetoed, then his expected
payo is vg1(?)+ (B CH + q+(1  q)CH) which is strictly lower than the payo from choosing
CL, that is B + E + [B + E   CH + q + (1   q)CH ]. In other words, the rst legislator will
never nd it optimal to choose CH when the second legislator will veto it. The same is true under
the alternative voting strategy 0gd because the payo for g1 from choosing C
H that is subsequently
vetoed is vg1(?) + (B   CH), which is again strictly smaller than the payo from choosing CL.
Hence, punishing only the rst legislator for choosing CH when this outcome is subsequently vetoed
does not make him more or less likely to choose CH over CL.
D Lemma A2
Lemma A2 Assume that the rst chamber retains proposal power in the second period with proba-
bility p. Then in t = 1 the minimum shares of rent required by the two legislators to choose the high
cost policy are ^1g1 = 
1
g1
 (1 p)[q+(1 q)CH (B+E)

] and ^1g2 = 
1
g2
+(1 p)[q+(1 q)CH (B+E)

].
Proof. If the rst chamber loses proposal power in the second period, the share of rents required to
choose the high cost policy in the rst period is eg1 = CH+E (B+E) , whereas if she retains proposal
power the share required is eg1 + [q + (1   q)CH (B+E) ]. Hence, when g1 retains proposal power
with probability p, the share of rents required to choose the high cost policy is ^1g1 =
eg1+p[q+(1 
q)C
H (B+E)

] or equivalently ^1g1 = 
1
g1
  (1   p)[q + (1   q)CH (B+E)

]. By the same argument,
the second chamber requires eg2 = CH+E (B+E) when she does not gain proposal power and
requires eg2 + [q+(1  q)CH (B+E) ] if she gains proposal power in the second period. Hence ^1g2 =
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eg2+(1 p)[q+(1 q)CH (B+E) ], which can be rewritten as ^1g2 = 1g2+(1 p)[q+(1 q)CH (B+E) ].

E Proof of Proposition 2
If the minimum shares required under unicameralism and bicameralism to choose CH are feasible
(i.e. 
1
g < 1 and
2P
d=1

1
gd
< 1), then CH is chosen. On the other hand, when the minimum shares
are not feasible (i.e. 
1
g > 1 and
2P
d=1

1
gd
> 1), then CL is chosen. Note that, when  = 0, then
2P
d=1

1
gd
 1g. Therefore, when 
1
g <
2P
d=1

1
gd
< 1, both shares are feasible and CH is chosen under both
legislative arrangements, whereas if
2P
d=1

1
gd
 1g > 1 none of the shares is feasible and CL is chosen
under both legislative arrangements. On the other hand, if 
1
g < 1 <
2P
d=1

1
gd
, only the unicameral
share is feasible implying that CH is chosen under unicameralism and CL under bicameralism.
Consider now the scenario where the time constraint is binding with some probability (0 <   1).
Then two cases arise. If
2P
d=1

1
gd
 1g, then we obtain the same policy choice characterized when
 = 0. On the other hand, when
2P
d=1

1
gd
< 
1
g the following holds. If the minimum shares under
the two legislative arrangements are feasible (
2P
d=1

1
gd
< 
1
g < 1) then C
H is chosen under both
arrangements, if the same shares are not feasible (
1
g >
2P
d=1

1
gd
> 1, then CL is chosen under both
arrangements. Finally, if
2P
d=1

1
gd
< 1 < 
1
g, then C
H is chosen under bicameralism whereas CL is
chosen under a unicameralism. 
F Proof of Lemma 5
In t = 2, since v2gd(C
L) > v2gd(?) 8d, in the absence of lobby transfers the rst legislator chooses CL
and the second legislator raties this choice. If amendment rights are restricted, once the policy
CL is chosen by the rst legislator, it can be amended to CH only if all legislators, including the
rst, approve the change. Remembering that in t = 2 each legislator and the lobby l make take-
it-or-leave-it oers with probability q and 1   q, then 2gd = q + (1   q)C
H

, with
P2
d=1 
2
gd
 1.
Moving backward to the rst period, for each legislator gd, the payo from C
H is Vgd(C
H) =
B+E+1gd CH+(B CH) and the payo from CL is Vgd(CL) = B+E+(B+E+2gd CH).
Therefore, if amendment rights are restricted, we nd that each legislators prefers CH to CL if and
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only if 1gd  E+C
H

+ [q + (1  q)CH

] with
P2
d=1 
2
gd
 1.
On the other hand, in the case of unrestricted amendment rights, if in t = 2 the policy CL is
chosen by the rst legislator, the lobby can still obtain CH by paying 2g2 = q + (1   q)C
H

to the
second legislator and 2g1 = 0 to the rst because v
2
g1
(CL) > v2g1(?). In the rst period, the second
legislator obtains the expected payo Vg2(C
H) = B+E+1gd CH+(B CH) by choosing CH , and
the payo Vg2(C
L) = B+E+(B+E+2g2 CH) from choosing CL. Hence, the second legislator
prefers CH to CL if and only if 1g2  E+C
H

+[q+(1 q)CH

]. On the other hand, remembering that
if CL is passed by the rst legislator, the lobby oers 1g2 =
E+CH

+ [q+ (1  q)CH

] to the second
legislator who amends CL to CH , then by choosing CL, the rst legislator obtains the expected
payo Vg1(C
L) = B+E CH + (B CH), whereas, by not passing any policy his expected payo
is Vg1(?) = (B + E   CH). Hence, if E + CH   (B + E) > 0 then Vg1(?) > Vg1(CL), which
implies that the rst legislator can credibly threaten not to pass any policy (i.e. Vg1(?) > Vg1(CH))
unless he receives 1g1  E+C
H (B+E)

> 0. On the other hand, if E +CH   (B +E)  0, the rst
legislator cannot credibly threaten not to choose any policy, and since Vg1(C
H)  Vg1(CL) 81g1 , the
lobby oers 1g1 = 0 and C
H is passed. 
G Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that lemma 5 holds. If the sum of the minimum shares is feasible (
P2
d=1 
1
gd
 1) then CH
is chosen, whereas if
P2
d=1 
1
gd
> 1, CL is chosen. Since the sum of the minimum shares under open
rule is at least as high than under closed rule, then: (a) whenever the the sum of the minimum
shares is not feasible under closed rule, it will also not be feasible under open rule; (b) When the
sum of the minimum share is feasible under closed rule, it may not be feasible under open rule.
From (a) and (b) we conclude that whenever the low cost policy is chosen under closed rule it will
also be chosen under open rule, while the reverse is not true.
Consider now the case where amendment rights are unrestricted, with 0 < 
1
gd
< 1 for all gd
and
P2
d=1 
1
gd
> 1. In this case, the rst legislator could choose CH if he is oered the appropriate
transfer. However, given that both legislators cannot be oered the transfer necessary to pass
CH , the lobby will not nd it optimal to carry out the transfer necessary to obtain CH in the
rst legislative step, knowing that this proposal will be overridden by the subsequent legislator.
As a consequence, the lobby oers 1g1 = 0 to the rst legislator. Since g1 anticipates that C
L
will be overridden by the last legislator who can receive the appropriate rent share for choosing
CH , then g1 rejects the oer and does not implement any policy. As a consequence, the second
legislator legislators without proposal power will not be able to amend any proposal, and the
mandate terminates with no policy implemented. 
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H Lemma A3
Lemma A3 Under open rule, the voting strategy  = [(CH) = 0; (CL) = 1; (?) = 1] is an
equilibrium voting strategy. Moreover, under unrestricted amendment rights it is unique.
Proof. Since the voting strategy depends only on the policy outcome, the optimality of the voting
strategy relies on the same arguments as in the unicameral case. In particular,  is an equilibrium
voting strategy since the voter is strictly better o by choosing  than under any alternative
strategy 0 such that either 0(CH) = 1 or 0(CL) = 0. Moreover, under unrestricted amendment
rights this is the unique equilibrium voting strategy because  = [(CH) = 0; (CL) = 1; (?) =
1] is strictly preferred to 0 = [0(CH) = 0; 0(CL) = 1; 0(?) = 0], since punishing or rewarding
the legislators for not implementing any policy is not pay-o irrelevant. In fact, note that with
unrestricted amendment rights, g1 might not nd it optimal to pass any policy in order to prevent
the nal implementation of CH . As a result, ? can be an outside option. Suppose now that the
voter adopts the voting strategy 0 = [(CH) = 0; (CL) = 1; (?) = 0]. In this case, because of
the punishment (?) = 0, not choosing any policy is strictly dominated by choosing either CL or
CH . Hence, either the rst legislator chooses CL and the last legislator amends it passing CH , or
both legislators pass CH . Since for the voter v1k(C
H) < v1k(?), then he strictly prefers  to 0. 
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